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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
By HUGER SINKLER AND THEODORE B. GUERARD*
"Civil Rights" Cases
The socialistic enunciations that have been coming forth
from the Supreme Court of the United States in Washington
during the last two decades have produced a noticeable effect
upon the type of cases involving constitutional questions.
Prior to the time when the Supreme Court of the United
States departed from its time-honored position as an inter-
preter of the Constitution of the United States and the effect
of that document on enactments of the Congress and state
legislatures, cases before the United States Supreme Court
in the field of constitutional law, generally related to the
construction of statutes and the defining of property rights
in relation thereto.
It had been intended by those who actually wrote the Con-
stitution of the United States that so long as the states
observed a republican form of government the exercise of the
police power was to be the function of the states. But with
the advent of the so-called "New Court", there has been a
striking tendency to invade fields which had been thought
by most legal scholars to have been of no concern to the
federal judiciary. This tendency is particularly noticeable
since Warren assumed office as Chief Justice of the United
States. Hence there have been constant encroachments upon
functions given by the Constitution to Congress and to the
states.
The post-Civil War amendments, including the Fourteenth
Amendment, were not believed by those who promoted them,
and certainly not many of the legislatures which ratified
these amendments, to have been intended to convert our
nation from one founded on Anglo-American theories of
jurisprudence to one conceived on the basis of socialistic
dogma. It would appear to be clear that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to supplement the Fifth Amend-
ment. The Fifth Amendment contains a due process provision
protecting the individual against abuses by the Federal Gov-
*Sinkler, Gibbs and Simons, Charleston, S. C.
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ernment. The Fourteenth Amendment was intended as a
counter-part to the Fifth Amendment which would afford the
individual similar protection against abuses from the states.
Yet from its present-day treatment, it would appear that the
Court conceives it to be the basic plank of the entire Constitu-
tion, which need not be harmonized with the rest of that
document, but may stand alone as though it were in fact an
entirely new Constitution. It is not surprising that the views
so pronounced have produced litigation conceived on theories
not earlier dreamed of. It is therefore interesting to observe
that in the cases decided by the South Carolina Supreme
Court in the period covered by this review, many involve
so-called Civil Rights, and reflect the attempt on the part of
individuals to assert so-called personal rights and privileges
allegedly conferred on them by the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is the theory of these persons that rights - social and
personal in nature - are paramount to basic property rights
so long cherished and fought for by the founders of this
nation. We should not fail to note, in passing, that if these
theories shall ultimately prevail, then there will have in fact
taken place a socialistic revolution whose. architects are
those occupying the highest judicial positions of the nation,
and who paradoxically have been sworn to uphold the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States as written, rather
than as promulgated by them.
Four decisions handed down during the period under review
arise out of the so-called "sit-in" demonstrations, and deal
with the same constitutional question: City of Greenville v.
Peterson,1 City of Charleston v. Mitchell,2 City of Columbia
v'. Barr,3 and City of Columbia v. Bouie.
4
The factual background in each of these cases was generally
the same. Negroes presented themselves in privately owned
and operated restaurants or lunch counters accustomed to
serving only white customers, and requested that they be
served. In each case service was refused, and the Negroes
were asked to leave the premises. The Negroes refused to
comply, and thereupon, were arrested and charged with.tres-
pass under one of several State statutes.5 In each case, the
1. 239 S. C: 298, 122 S. E. 2d 826 (1961).
2. 239 S. C. 376, 123 S. E. 2d 512 (1961).
3. 239 S. C. 395, 123 S. E. 2d. 521 (1961).
4. 239 S. C. 570, 124 S. E. 2d 332 (1962).
5. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROtINA, §§ 16-388 and 16-386 (1952).
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demonstrators were convicted, and they appealed their con-
victions to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The question before the Court was the reconciliation of
two basic legal concepts - one of ancient Anglo-American
origin, and the other of recent expression. The State, in
urging that the convictions be upheld, based its position on
the traditional concept of private property, and the basic
rights inherent therein which are recognized and protected
by the states through the enforcement of the trespass statutes
which act without discrimination upon, and for the protection
of, all citizens without regard to race or color. The de-
fendants, on the other hand, based their appeals upon the
legal concept first enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in 1948 in the case of Shelly v. Kramer.6
The Shelly decision represents a landmark decision in the
interpretation and implementation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. This case involved the right of property owners
to enforce, in state courts, residential restrictions limiting
the occupancy of property to persons of the caucasian race.
At the time-the case-was argued, it was generally held that
privately agreed upon racial restrictions were outside the
purview of the Fourteenth Amendment, and could be enforced
in law or equity in the same manner as other restrictive
covenants are enforced. However, in -the Shelly decision,
written by then Chief Justice Vinson, it was held that the
action of state courts to enforce racial restrictions and thereby
to deny, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of
property rights which the petitioners were willing and fi-
nancially able to acquire, was, in effect, state action which
denied rights subject to the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The decision held such private agreements were
not themselves prohibited, but the enforcement of them by a
state court constitutes state action within the proscription of
the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore, violated consti-
tutional rights of the persons excluded in derogatibn of the
equal protection clause.
The concept of the Shelly decision provided the legal under-
pinning for the defendants' argument in the cases under
review. They concede that the South Carolina trespass statutes
are constitutional, but contend that state action in enforcing
6. 334 U. S. 1; 92 L. Ed. 845; 68 S. Ct. 836;-3 A.L.R. 2d 441 (1948).
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them violated the defendants' rights subject to the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
state action furthered and implemented a policy of racial
segregation in the State of South Carolina.7
In the Peterson decision, the first of the four handed down,
the South Carolina Supreme Court ignored the basic question
of state action, and, in upholding the convictions, ruled that
the Fourteenth Amendment "erects no shield against merely
private conduct however discriminatory or wrongful." The
opinion cites the Shelly decision, and declares as the general
rule that:
In the absence of a statute forbidding discrimination
based on race or color, the operator of a privately owned
place of business has the right to select the clientele he
will serve irrespective of color.
In the next decision, City of Charleston v. Mitchell, by the
late Mr. Justice Oxner, the Court did consider the question of
what constitutes state action within the prohibition of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion points out that uphold-
ing the position of the defendants would mean that a property
owner could enforce his rights against white trespassers but
not against Negro trespassers. The opinion then specifically
holds that the acts of judicial officers of the state in arresting
the defendants do not constitute state action in enforcing
racial segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the last two decisions the contention of the appellants
was overridden on the authority of the earlier Peterson and
Mitchell decisions.
Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court
in the Peterson case and it was argued before the United
States Supreme Court on November 6, 1962. On the same
day, similar decisions from the state courts of Alabama,
Louisiana and North Carolina were also argued, but no edict
from the Warren Court has yet been handed down in any of
these cases as of the date of this writing. A decision uphold-
ing the position of the appellant demonstrators would estab-
lish a concept, the full implications of which cannot be
7. This contention apparently only applies to those states where the
use of its police power to enforce trespass statutes supposedly stems from
a community custom "generated" by a "complex network of State laws"
to perpetuate racial segregation. In recently arguing a similar North
Carolina case before the United States Supreme Court, the attorney for
the demonstrators agreed that discrimination by a New York or Montana
store owner would stand on a different footing!
Vol. 15
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foreseen. As was pointed out by the North Carolina Supreme
Court, in its opinion in the case of Avent v. North Carolina,"
the right to eject trespassers, if not recognized and enforced
by state law, will be handled by individual property owners,
and the peace and security of the community seriously
threatened as a result. So-called social or personal rights
thus upheld could destroy our present concepts of all property
rights, with resulting chaos.
Statute Requiring Parade Permit Held Constitutional
Here again, we have a "Civil Rights" case. In the City
of Darlington v. Stanley,9 the appellants were convicted in the
lower court for staging a parade or procession on the city
streets without a permit, in violation of an ordinance of the
city of Darlington requiring a permit for all parades and
processions within the corporate limits of the city of Darling-
ton. The ordinance provided that upon application being made,
"the Mayor or City Council shall in its discretion issue such
permit subject to the public convenience and public welfare."
Appellants in fact had never applied for a permit.
The appellants based their appeal on the proposition that
the aforesaid ordinance was unconstitutional, (a) because it
fixed no standard to be used by the City Council and Mayor in
considering whether or not to issue a permit, and (b) because
it deprived the appellants of their constitutionally guaranteed
rights of freedom of speech and assembly (Section 4, Article
I of the South Carolina Constitution and the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United State Constitution).
In a well written opinion by Mr. Justice Oxner, the South
Carolina Supreme Court upheld the convictions. The opinion
points out that although the ordinance set forth no express
standards to guide the City Council and the Mayor in the
issuance of parade permits, it was, nevertheless, implicit,
that they be guided by the safety, comfort and convenience of
those using the streets. The opinion recognizes the general
rule that a statute which reposes an absolute or undefined
discretion in an administrative or public body will not be
upheld. However, the Court concluded that in the instant case,
the discretion of the Mayor and City Council was not unfet-
tered and could not be exercised arbitrarily, but must be
8. 253 N. C. 580, 118 S. E. 2d 47 (1961).
9. 239 S. C. 139, 122 S. E. 2d 207 (1961).
1962]
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exercised in connection with the safety, public order and
convenience in the use of the streets.
Regarding the issue of freedom of speech and assembly,
the opinion points out that these freedoms, while they are
fundamental, are not absolute, and must be exercised in
subordination to the general comfort and convenience and in
consonance with peace and good order - that is to say, they
are subject to the police power of the state. The Court con-
cluded that the ordinance here was a reasonable and nondis-
criminatory regulation and limitation upon freedom of speech
and assembly.
Due Process Clause Does Not Require Counsel
to Be Provided in All Noncapital Cases
The appellant in the case of Shelton v. The State'0 had been
charged in the Court of General Sessions for York County with
the crime of assault with intent to kill, and he plead guilty to
the lesser offense of assault of a high and aggravated nature
and was sentenced to six years imprisonment. The appeal was
from the order of the lower court denying his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, and the appellant contended that his
sentence was invalid because he had not been represented by
counsel at the time he plead guilty.
In upholding the lower court, the Supreme Court pointed
out: (1) that there is no statutory requirement for the
appointment of counsel to represent a person charged with the
commission of a crime, except when the charge is a capital
offense; (2) that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United State Constitution requires counsel
in noncapital cases in state courts only where necessary to
insure the furtherance of justice; and (3) the voluntary
intoxication of the defendant at the time of the commission
of the crime in no way invalidated his subsequent plea of
guilty.
The opinion here is constitutionally sound, and apparently
well supported by the facts. At the time that he plead guilty,
the defendant was in control of his faculties and at no time
did he request counsel. Apparently his alleged grievance arose
only because he was given a heavier sentence than he was
expecting.
10. 239 S. C. 535, 123 S. E. 2d 867 (1962).
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Lee County Forestry Board Act an
Unconstitutional Special Act
Apparently an impasse had existed over a period of several
years prior to 1961 between the members of the Lee County
delegation, who could not agree on recommendations of persons
to fill vacancies in the Lee County Forestry Board in the
manner prescribed by the general statute providing for the
appointment in each county of a County Forestry Board. As
a consequence, the Lee County Forestry Board existing in
1961, had been, with the exception of one member, appointed
by the State Forestry Commission.
The 1961 legislation under attack in the case of McElveen,
et al v. Stokes, et al," in effect appointed by name to the Lee
County Forestry Board four individuals to replace four that
were serving under appointments from the State Forestry
Commission. These appointees of the State Forestry Com-
mission instituted this action to have the said Act declared
unconstitutional. The lower court sustained the constitu-
tionality of the statute as a special provision in a general law
within the purview of Article III, Section 34, Subdivision IX,
of the South Carolina Constitution. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, reversed the lower court, and held that the legislation
was an unconstitutional special act in controvention of Article
III, Section 34, Subdivision IX, of the South Carolina Con-
stitution prohibiting a -special law where a general law can be
made applicable.
The opinion in some detail outlines the background of
Subdivision IX of Section 34 of Article III as an effort to
avoid legislation by delegation and to insure the most thorough
consideration of public problems by the General Assembly as
a whole.
In striking down the statute, the opinion points out that
here not only can a general law be made applicable, but a-
general law has in fact been made applicable by the legislature
in the enactment of the Forest Fire Protection Act of 1945.
In this connection it should be noted that under the South
Carolina decisions, the existence of a general law is not the
determining factor on the issue here, but rather it is the
existence of the power of the General Assembly to enact an
applicable general law that is the determining factor.
11. 240 S. C. 1, 124 S. E. 2d 592 (1962).
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